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Abstract
Many countries around the world are experiencing a significant shift in demographic patterns towards an older
population. The age composition of the labor force has also changed dramatically, often accompanied by sharp
reductions in the labor force participation rates of older workers. These phenomena in concert pose numerous
challenges for the design of public pension programs and labor market policies in general. While governments
have traditionally encouraged early retirement by the elderly to free up jobs for the young, such policies now
impose an unprecedented tax burden on the current younger generations of working individuals. This has
prompted many governments to instead adopt policies that promote old-age labor force participation. The
primary goal of this paper is to draw some qualitative insights about these different policy responses within
the context of a dynamic general equilibrium model. In order to address the role of the lifecycle for the
allocation of workers to jobs, we develop a model of the labor market characterized by search and matching
frictions and embed it into an overlapping-generations framework. We explicitly introduce age-targeted labor
market policies and endogenize labor force participation across all age groups. Our analysis reveals that the
age composition of the labor force may cause an inefficient allocation of workers to jobs in the labor market
thereby creating an efficiency-enhancing role for publicly-induced retirement. Interestingly, we also find that
public pension programs may improve labor market welfare by "redistributing bargaining power" over the
lifecycle. Our work suggests that recent policy initiatives aimed at reducing the work disincentives currently
embedded in many public pension programs may further the income redistribution motive of social security,
encourage labor market participation among the elderly, and increase total employment. In this vein, we find
that complete elimination of the earnings test may
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Abstract
Many countries around the world are experiencing a significant shift in demographic patterns
towards an older population. The age composition of the labor force has also changed dramatically,
often accompanied by sharp reductions in the labor force participation rates of older workers. These
phenomena in concert pose numerous challenges for the design of public pension programs and labor
market policies in general. While governments have traditionally encouraged early retirement by
the elderly to free up jobs for the young, such policies now impose an unprecedented tax burden on
the current younger generations of working individuals. This has prompted many governments to
instead adopt policies that promote old-age labor force participation. The primary goal of this paper
is to draw some qualititative insights about these diﬀerent policy responses within the context of a
dynamic general equilibrium model. In order to address the role of the lifecycle for the allocation
of workers to jobs, we develop a model of the labor market characterized by search and matching
frictions and embed it into an overlapping-generations framework. We explicitly introduce age-
targeted labor market policies and endogenize labor force participation across all age groups. Our
analysis reveals that the age composition of the labor force may cause an ineﬃcient allocation of
workers to jobs in the labor market thereby creating an eﬃciency-enhancing role for publicly-induced
retirement. Interestingly, we also find that public pension programs may improve labor market
welfare by “redistributing bargaining power” over the lifecycle. Our work suggests that recent policy
initiatives aimed at reducing the work disincentives currently embedded in many public pension
programs may further the income redistribution motive of social security, encourage labor market
participation among the elderly, and increase total employment. In this vein, we find that complete
elimination of the earnings test may improve labor market welfare.
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“The basic public policy dilemma is the conflict between the use of early retirement as an
instrument for alleviating unemployment among younger workers and the longer term fi-
nancial viability of pension systems in aging societies”. International Labor Organization
(1997)
1 Introduction
In recent years, many countries have experienced a significant shift in demographic patterns towards
the elderly. The age composition of the labor force is also changing rapidly. There are concomitant
changes taking place in individual labor market activity too. People are retiring earlier and living longer
after retirement than their counterparts in earlier cohorts. These phenomena in concert pose numerous
challenges for the design of public pension programs and labor market policies in general (Diamond 1997,
2001). In response to these changes, some policymakers have called for reduced benefits (or higher taxes
to pay for the benefits) while others have argued that it would be more beneficial to eliminate the work
disincentives currently embedded in many pension systems.
In light of these demographic changes and the varied policy responses, there has been a recent surge
in research activity using general equilibrium models to study some important aspects of social security
policies (such as, their implications for income redistribution, private savings, etc.); yet not much work
has explored their labor market consequences.1 There is also a large literature that studies the eﬀects
of public pension programs on individual labor market outcomes and ignores the aggregate eﬀects.2
In contrast, the primary goal of this paper is to study the implications of public pension programs
for the labor market at the aggregate level. To the best of our knowledge, ours is a first attempt at
shedding “qualitative general equilibrium” light on classic policy questions, such as, should the earnings
test be eliminated or should pension programs induce retirement, or do public pension programs hurt
the younger generations by increasing taxes and overall unemployment, etc.– questions that are at the
forefront of numerous current public policy debates.
To that end, we develop a model in which there is an explicit separation of the workforce into
young and old workers; moreover, unemployment arises as an endogenous outcome. Specifically, we
embed a model of the labor market characterized by search and matching frictions, into an overlapping-
generations (OG) model with finitely-lived agents. The low-frequency nature of the OG model renders
1Principal contributions in this literature include Abel (2000), Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1985, 1987), Boldrin and
Rustichini (2001), Cooley and Soares (1999), de Nardi, Imrohoroglu, and Sargent (1999), and Kotlikoﬀ et. al. (1998).
2Prominent examples include Gruber and Orszag (2000) and Coile and Gruber (2000a, 2000b), among others.
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itself useful for exploring the importance of long term job attachment and firm-specific human capital,
both well-known as being important characteristics of modern labor markets. The lifecycle of workers
explicit in the OG setup in conjunction with the frictions in the labor market also generates a rich
environment in which both young and old workers may find themselves contemporaneously competing
for the same jobs. This may produce an ineﬃcient allocation of workers to jobs in the aggregate, and
through this channel, open up an eﬃciency-enhancing role for publicly-induced withdrawal of specific
age groups from the labor market.
A few details of the model setup are in order here. At any date, there are some newly-born (young)
agents and some old agents. All young agents are unemployed at birth; they will incur some costs
before they may search for employment opportunities. Firms post vacancies also at a cost and enter
the labor market only if there are profits to be made from doing so. There is a standard economy-wide
non-discriminating stochastic matching technology that connects vacancies to people. Once job matches
are formed, production takes place. At the end of the period, some job matches will remain intact while
other workers will become involuntarily displaced from their jobs.3 These “displaced” workers may
choose to re-enter the labor market to seek employment in the following period. At the start of any
date, then, all the young workers, all the displaced workers (who are old), and all the old who did not
get matched to jobs when young, enter the labor market seeking employment. The remaining agents
in the economy are the old who retained jobs from the previous period. All new matches produce the
same amount of gross output. Firms incur training and re-tooling costs if they hire a young worker
or an old unemployed worker but not if they continue an employment relationship from the previous
period. The surplus produced by a match is shared by the parties under protocols of Nash bargaining.
We incorporate various aspects of real-world age-specific labor market policies, such as public pension
programs and long-term old-age unemployment insurance programs, into our model. We allow for social
security payments to be tied to a worker’s prior earnings (a.k.a, replacement rate). In addition, we
capture some of the work disincentives embedded in many public pension programs by asserting that
workers who choose to work when old receive only a fraction of benefits due to them. This feature
integrates a notion of an “earnings test” in our model. Importantly, taxes required to pay for public
policies in our framework are endogenous. That is, our framework explicitly incorporates a government
with the power to impose payroll taxes on both firms and workers and use that revenue to finance its
3Thus, the expected duration of a job for a young worker is more than one period. The “durability” of a job implies that
the benefit of working for a young worker is more than the current wage; it is also the expectation of retaining employment
in the future. Davidson, Martin, and Matusz (1994) demonstrate how the durability of jobs results in a social surplus
when workers have finite lives in an infinite-horizon economy.
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pension program or pay for any subsidies. A key finding here is that policies intended to aﬀect the lives
of workers have general equilibrium consequences for firms (it aﬀects their decision to create vacancies)
which in turn aﬀects the welfare of workers. It is this last eﬀect that is rarely stressed in the popular
rhetoric or the partial-equilibrium labor economics tradition.4
Our main qualitative results may be summarized as follows. First, we identify a sense in which
public pensions redistribute bargaining power from young to old workers. Young workers (by virtue
of the fact that they have a period of life ahead of them) have higher bargaining power than the old.
However, under public pension programs, the state of being employed when young raises the worker’s
expected net income in the future. The firm realizes that having a job today implies current (and future)
benefits to the employee; the firm naturally extracts part of that surplus. Thus, positive replacement
rates serve a key social function: they reduce bargaining inequities over the lifecycle and keep young
workers’ wages and hence labor costs low. At the same time, high replacement rates raise payroll costs
because old workers become eligible for higher transfer payments and this raises their bargaining power,
wages, and total (wages gross of pensions) incomes. Completely eliminating the earnings test improves
the redistribution of bargaining power over the lifecycle. Furthermore, at higher replacement rates, the
drop in the payroll costs of young workers may outweigh the higher costs of employing old workers so
that there is more employment as a result of the redistribution.
Is it ever welfare-improving to induce withdrawal by the old and discouraged workers from the labor
force? We find the answer is yes — for a given earnings penalty, we find that policy-induced retirement
achieved by increasing the replacement rate and providing young workers with a higher chance of finding
long-term employment may improve aggregate labor market welfare. As in many search models of the
labor market, workers here impose a congestion externality on the unemployed — for a fixed number
of vacancies, an increase in the number of workers renders it less likely that a given worker will find
a job. Furthermore, due to the possibility for the accumulation of firm-specific human capital in our
setup, allowing young workers to have a greater chance of finding employment improves the allocation
of workers to jobs in the economy. However, we find the greatest welfare gains may occur when the
earnings test is completely eliminated and old individuals choose to remain active in the labor market.
4 In related work, Shimer (2001) also studies the implications of population aging for the labor market. In contrast to our
work, all workers in his model are infinitely-lived and in each period, a new generation of workers is born. Our methodology
is most closely related to Pissarides (1992) who utilizes a two-period overlapping generations model with labor market
frictions to study the implications of the loss of productivity that may accompany long-term unemployment. In contrast
to our framework, all jobs in his model only last for one period, and there are no costs to labor market participation.
While his analysis provides a number of interesting implications for aggregate labor market outcomes, it does not address
the important interactions between wages at each stage of the lifecycle, age-targeted labor market policies (such as public
pension programs), and retirement decisions.
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The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. In order to provide some helpful background, we
begin with a brief survey of the available evidence on population aging, its implications for labor market
activity, and age-specific labor market policies in OECD countries in Section 2. In Section 3, we outline
the baseline model in which workers of all ages and employment histories choose to participate in the
labor market. The next section studies a specific labor market participation pattern, one in which
all the old displaced workers are induced to withdraw from the labor market as a result of the work
disincentives in pension programs. Section 5 considers some alternative labor market policies, which we
refer to as “active labor market programs” aimed at promoting employment in the labor market rather
than encouraging old workers to retire. In Section 6 we study the welfare consequences of public pension
programs, publicly induced retirement, and some active labor market policies. Section 7 concludes. The
appendices contain derivations of some important results as well as a detailed discussion of the algorithm
used to compute various equilibria in the model.
2 Stylized Facts and Issues
2.1 Recent Trends in Population Aging and Labor Force Participation
The populations of many developed countries around the world have increasingly become older over the
past century. In the United States, for example, while 4% of the population was aged sixty-five years or
older in 1900, this number rose to 12.5% in 1994, and is projected to spiral up to 20% by 2050. At the
same time, the age composition of the labor force is also changing in a dramatic fashion. The median
age of the work force in the United States is expected to cross 40 by 2005 compared to 34.7 in 1979.
Many countries have also witnessed large reductions in labor force participation rates of older workers
since 1950. In the United States in 1950, 46% of men sixty-five years and older were active in the labor
force, compared to only 16% in 1993. These demographic phenomena in tandem pose many challenges
for the design of public pension programs and labor market policies in general.
2.2 Age and Individual Labor Market Outcomes
Recent evidence suggests that an individual’s age has important implications for their labor market
experiences. First, the unemployment rate of younger workers is higher than that of older workers. For
example, in 1987, the unemployment rate for male workers under the age of 25 in the US was 12.6%
compared to 4.8% for those over the age of 25. In France during the same period, the unemployment
rate for younger workers was 19.6%, but only 6.4% for older workers. Second, the incidence of long-
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term unemployment is much higher for older workers. In the United States in 1996, while the rate of
long-term unemployment for the overall labor force (15 to 64 years) was only 9.3%, this number rises to
14.6% for older workers (between the ages of 45 and 64). In France, the relative frequency of long-term
unemployment among the entire workforce is much higher (39.5%); that for workers between the ages
of 45 and 64 is as high as 62.0%.
Older workers who experience involuntary job loss are more likely to become permanently separated
from their employers. Chan and Stevens (2001, 2002) find re-employment rates of older workers follow-
ing displacement are significantly lower than nondisplaced workers and that displacement aﬀects the
likelihood of retirement. In particular, O’Leary and Wandner (2000) conclude that while less than 10%
of displaced workers under the age of 55 permanently exit the labor force, more than 25% of workers
between the ages of 55 and 64 and almost half of workers over the age of 65 opt for retirement instead
of searching for alternative sources of employment upon displacement.5’6 Additionally, as discussed in
Jacobson et. al. (1993), displaced workers on finding employment receive wages that are about 25%
lower than in their previous job.
An important explanation for why older workers face employment diﬃculties, due to Oi (1962),
and further advanced by Hutchens (1986), is that the initiation of an employment relationship requires
firms to incur fixed costs thereby increasing the net revenues from employing younger workers.7 An
alternative interpretation is that firms prefer to employ younger workers to allow for more accumulation
of firm-specific human capital. It may also be that firms avoid older workers because they are less
productive.8
The duration of employment also tends to increase with age. Median tenure of older workers aged
45 to 54 was more than three times that of workers age 25 to 34. In fact, 34% of male workers aged
25 and over had worked for their current employer for 10 years or more in February 2000; for workers
aged 55-64, 28% had worked for their current employer 20 years or more. Hall (1982) finds that after a
job has lasted 5 years, the probability that it will eventually last 20 years or more in all rises to close
to 0.5 among workers in their early thirties. These data imply that tenure with a firm is long for many
5Diamond and Hausman (1984) discuss how late career job loss aﬀects retirement. Ruhm (1990, 1995) elaborates on
the numerous pathways towards retirement.
6 In Section 4, we formally demonstrate how public pension programs encourage individuals to retire after incurring
late-career job loss. That is, the retirement choice is policy-induced.
7See also Hurd (1996) and OECD (1994).
8Diamond and Hausman (1984), among others, emphasize that older workers are likely to experience employment
diﬃculties due to declining health status. Gruber and Madrian (1995) and Gruber and Wise (1999) also discuss the role
of declining health as a prime motive for early retirement for older workers in many OECD countries. Borsch-Supan and
Schnabel (1999), Bound (1989, 1991), Gruber (1996), Gruber and Kubik (1997), and Gruber and Wise (2001) consider the
role of disability insurance programs for retirement incentives.
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Americans.9
2.3 Retirement-Inducing Policies Around the World
We summarize some important features of social security (SS) programs that are of relevance for our
study. First, SS programs have a significant impact on labor market behavior. Gruber and Wise
(1999) attribute the aforementioned large drop in labor force participation rates of older workers to
the vast generosity of social security programs, early retirement schemes, and long-term unemployment
insurance programs for older workers. Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999a, 1999b) document that of the
94 countries for which this information was available, 91 induce workers to retire — 74 of them mandate
retirement in order to collect benefits while the other 17 encourage retirement through tax and benefit
formulas.10 Second, the majority of SS programs are pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems which are financed
with payroll taxes, split between both the employer and employee. SS benefits are generally related in
some way to the number of years worked (and amount of taxes paid). In particular, in many OECD
countries, eligibility for public pension programs requires a history of labor force attachment.11 Often,
the pensions provided are linked to some measure of accumulated earnings.
The fact that so many SS programs require retirement as a necessary qualification suggests that they
are an important tool for regulating the flows in and out of the labor market. In fact, a commonly-held
view about social security, is that it is a means to transfer jobs from older, employed workers to young,
unemployed individuals.12 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in one of his celebrated “fireside chats”
clearly indicated that this would be an important goal for social security: “The program for social
security now pending before the Congress is a necessary part of the future unemployment policy of the
Government...It proposes, by means of old-age pensions, to help those who have reached the age of
9Long-term job attachment is an important aspect of the labor market in other coutries too. For example, according to
a recent survey [Labour Market Detachment among Older Men, C. Beatty and S. Fothergill, Centre for Regional Economic
and Social Research, Sheﬃeld Hallam University, 1999], “two-thirds of non-working British men over 50 had spent more
than 10 years in their last job and nearly half more than 20 years.”
10They also provide a very detailed survey of various aspects of public pension programs, both historically and interna-
tionally. Their paper also reviews a variety of political economy explanations and eﬃciency theories for the existence of
social security. Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000b) describe how a number of public policies besides social security may
be designed to induce retirement.
11For example, in Spain, the minimum number of years of contributions required to obtain social security is 15; in
Italy, the number is 20. In the United States, workers are eligible for benefits after 40 quarters of covered employment.
In Germany, some pension benefits are available for workers after a 45 year earnings history and there are preretirement
schemes for workers who have contributed for only 15 years. In France, a common requirement is 37.5 years of contributions
for full benefits with reductions for less labor market attachment. (Blanchet and Pele 1999, Boldrin et. al. 1999, Borsch-
Schupan and Schnabel 1999, and OECD 1995).
12 In Bhattacharya, Mulligan, and Reed (2001), we find that although it is possible that policy-induced retirement can
promote labor market eﬃciency, most public pension programs pay the elderly substantially more than labor market search
theory implies that their jobs are worth.
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retirement to give up their jobs and thus give to the younger generation greater opportunities for work
and to give all a feeling of security as they look toward their old age...”(Roosevelt, pp.134-5)13
Finally, as documented in Gruber and Wise (1999), many countries have introduced a variety of early
retirement schemes and long-term unemployment insurance programs that allow for older, displaced
workers to retire well before the normal retirement age. These programs, introduced directly to combat
unemployment problems facing younger workers, are fairly generous, providing as much as 60-70% of
previous income. An often-cited example is France where the “contrat de solidarite” recognized the
“double need to encourage 55-59 year-old workers to stop work and bring young workers into the labor
market, as rising youth unemployment was a growing concern to society as a whole.” Furthermore, such
policies eﬀectively banned the old unemployed workers from the labor market – in order to receive
their long-term unemployment insurance, these workers are required to stop seeking employment.14
3 The Baseline Model with Complete Labor Market Participation
3.1 Basic setup
We consider an economy consisting of an infinite sequence of two-period lived overlapping generations.
The economy is populated by two types of agents, workers and firms. There is no growth in the
population sizes of these agents. Workers live only for two periods. There are two types of workers in a
period — young and old. Each generation of workers is of equal measure, 12 , so that the total population
of workers is equal to 1 each period. At birth, all workers are unemployed. Old workers may be in one
of three possible states: unemployed, separated (they were employed while young, but have lost their
job; see discussion below), or employed. All workers are risk-neutral and share the same rate of time
preference, β. There are no private saving instruments. Firms produce a homogeneous consumption
good each period using labor as the sole factor of production. Production is the result of a pairwise
matching between one worker and a firm. Firms are infinitely-lived with a total population of measure
F in each period. For ease of presentation, we assume that both workers and firms share the same
discount factor β. All firms have access to the same technology. Firms maximize the present discounted
stream of revenues net of all costs. Finally, there is a government which implements a set of tax and
13 In Britain, the Job Release Scheme which ran between 1977 and 1988, specifically encouraged older workers to “stand
down to make way for younger ones.” See also the discussion in Layard et. al. (1993), OECD (1994, 1995), Schulz (2001),
and the Social Security Retirement Test (1991).
14For more details, see the OECD (1995) study on “The Labor Market and Older Workers”, Gruber and Wise (1999),
and the discussion in Bhattacharya, Mulligan, and Reed (2001).
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transfer policies and possibly some “active labor market policies” to be described below.
3.2 The Labor Market
The principal alleged benefit of policies aimed at increasing labor force participation from older workers
is that they would enlarge the tax base and thereby oﬀset some of the costs of financing public pension
programs. On the other hand, according to the “lump of labor” line of thought, a possible cost of
encouraging labor market participation among all age-groups is higher unemployment, an eﬀect that
has received considerable attention in Europe.15 To investigate the merits of these arguments, we first
consider, as a benchmark case, the labor market implications of public pension programs that exist
but do not induce retirement. We start by conjecturing an equilibrium in which all workers (especially,
the old) choose to participate in the labor market. We then identify a set of policy parameters which
support this conjectured steady-state equilibrium. Under some pension systems, some workers will be
better oﬀ choosing to retire and therefore the equilibrium fails to exist. This is the algorithm we adopt
in order to endogenize labor force participation for workers at each stage of the lifecycle.
The time line is as follows. At the start of each period, the labor market opens. At that time,
unemployed workers, be they old or young, choose whether to search for vacancies or not. If they decide
to search, they incur a search cost, s, which is expressed in terms of disutility of search. As described
in Pissarides (2001), s represents the imputed value of leisure in terms of output (utility). On the other
side of the market, firms make the decision whether to pay some upfront costs (described below) and
enter the labor market to look for employees. Each firm may employ at most one worker. Let U (Fv)
denote the total mass of unemployed workers (unfilled vacancies) at the start of a period.
A stochastic matching technology connects all job seekers with open vacancies. The technology
does not discriminate on the basis of age, and therefore, any unemployed (old or young) worker faces
the same probability α of getting matched with a vacancy.16 Once the labor market opens, firms and
workers have at most one opportunity to meet and match. At the end of any period, the employment
relationship between a worker and a firm ends involuntarily with a given probability b.17 Put diﬀerently,
15A particularly stark example is Belgium. There, in 2000, for every 100 employed persons, 86 people over the age of 20
were without work. More than half of those unemployed people were below the age of 65, and most were receiving social
benefits. [Source: Miranda, Penner, and Steuerle, 2002]
16Our matching structure bears many similarities to Pissarides (1992). As in his framework, workers and firms may make
at most one job contact each period, and the probabilities of matching are the same for each type of worker irrespective
of age (i.e., we also assume a non-discriminating matching technology). Our matching technology could be interpreted as
part of a labor market in which age-discrimination laws are fully enforced.
17All job separations in the model are exogenous and outside of the worker’s influence. In this sense, b is a measure of
the frequency of involuntary job separations, and therefore, parameterizes the degree of job security; see Farber (1997),
Gottschalk and Moﬃtt (1999), and OECD (1997) for related discussion.
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a given match lasts for a minimum (maximum) length of one (two) period(s).
At the beginning of the period, an old worker finds himself in one of three possible employment cate-
gories: employed [attached to a match from the previous period with probability α (1− b)], unemployed
[with probability (1−α)], or displaced (working when young, but lost the job with probability αb). We
also refer to displaced workers as those who have been ‘separated’ from their previous source of employ-
ment. Hence, we use the terms ‘separated’ and ‘displaced’ interchangeably. Following Pissarides (1992),
we refer to old workers who begin the period unemployed as the ‘long-term’ unemployed. On-the-job
search is disallowed by our assumption regarding timing of labor market openings. For future reference,
note that old never-before-employed workers, unlike old displaced workers, have no prior earnings. This
will create a distinction between them if governmental transfer payments are tied to past earnings. At
the end of the period, young employed workers learn their employment status for the following period
(i.e., whether their current match survives to the next period or gets dissolved); at this time, old workers
die.
Firms incur costs of posting vacancies, denoted by a. Once they have incurred this cost and searched
for workers, all firms are equally likely to find a worker. The probability that a vacancy finds a worker
is θ. The probabilities of meeting a given type of worker, however, will depend on the proportion of each
type of worker in the labor market. The total measures of young, separated, and long-term unemployed
workers are uy, us, and uo. The total mass of unemployed workers (and hence searching for jobs) is U .
The probability of finding a young unemployed worker is θu˜y, where u˜y ≡
uy
U . Similarly, the probability
that a vacancy locates an old separated (long-term unemployed) worker is θu˜s (θu˜o).
Following the insight of Oi (1962), we posit that there are costs which must be incurred at the
beginning of an employment relationship. We refer to these as “hiring” costs, and denote them as h.
Let p denote the exogenously-determined market value of the firm’s output. Matches with new hires
require the firm and the worker to incur the costs of “hiring and training” so that the net output
from new matches is (p − h) while net output from a match with an old, retained worker is p. Under
this interpretation, one may view h as a cost that is incurred each time a firm makes a new hire.
Alternatively, h may proxy a productivity diﬀerential between new and old matches. In the latter
sense, one may also interpret h as a parameter which reflects the importance of firm-specific human
capital. As described in Hutchens (1986), firms therefore derive higher net revenues from employing
workers with longer expected tenure.18
18According to a recent British survey [Labour Market Detachment among Older Men, C. Beatty and S. Fothergill,
Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research, Sheﬃeld Hallam University, 1999], “... some 49 per cent of employers
[in Britain] were reluctant to fund training for older staﬀ because of shorter payback times or perceptions about older
10
The pre-tax wage rate(s) for the diﬀerent types of workers are determined (see below) in accor-
dance with the protocols of Nash bargaining. The presence of age-targeted labor market policies and
the aforementioned accumulation of firm-specific human capital will cause the wages of workers (with
diﬀerent employment histories) to vary.
3.3 Specification of Labor Market Policies
We incorporate various aspects of real-world age-specific labor market policies, such as public pension
programs and long-term old-age unemployment insurance programs, into our model. These take a
particularly simple and stylized form. Old workers, currently or previously employed (i.e., those who
have paid income taxes in the past) are eligible for transfer payments from the government. As is
common in many countries, these payments are tied to a worker’s prior earnings. In our framework,
an old worker’s prior earnings is simply her pre-tax wage (received when young), denoted wy. The
replacement rate on a worker’s prior earnings is denoted by η.19 Specifically, old workers who are not
currently employed (but were, when young and paid social security taxes) are eligible for publicly-
provided pensions in the amount ηwy.20
We also allow for aspects of earnings reductions, as observed in many programs, into our framework.
We capture the notion of an “earnings test” by asserting that workers who work when old receive only
a fraction δ of benefits due to them.21 For example, an old worker who retained her job from a previous
match and receives a current pre-tax wage of weo receives a total income (based upon wages and pension
benefits) of the amount weo + δηwy. Separated workers who find jobs when old and receive a current
workers’ ability to acquire skills.”
19Replacement rates which compare individuals’ initial Social Security benefits with past wages, are frequently used
to determine whether or not recent retirees can maintain their preretirement standard of living. Currently in the US, a
worker’s earnings in her 35 highest-earning years are averaged and used, which maps on to a replacement rate of about
52%. Current replacement rates in Portugal and Germany are as high as 70%. Workers with full-contribution careers
in France receive, on average, 80 percent of their last net wages, with the replacement rate varying from 100 percent for
low-wage earners to 65 percent for top-wage earners. For more discussion, see OECD (1994).
20This is one of the benefits of our deterministic, discrete-time model. Since each worker receives only one job contact
each period, it is very easy to trace an old worker’s employment status to his employment history. The linkages between
eligibility for transfer payments (such as social security) and a worker’s prior labor market history are clearly important,
yet often ignored in models of the labor market.
21The “earnings test” that was applied in the United States until 2000 could be described as follows. In 1999, a worker
age 62 to 65 could earn up to $9,600 without the loss of any benefits, then benefits were reduced $1 for each $2 of earnings
above this amount; for workers age 65 to 69, the earnings test floor was $15,500 and benefits were reduced at a rate of $1
for each $3 in earnings.
In April 2000, the earnings test was lifted for workers sixty-five and over in the United States. A number of countries are
also considering eliminating the earnings test from their SS programs. Although our framework is not suited to capture
the specific features of various versions of the earnings test, we can consider its implications, more broadly defined, for
retirement behavior and wages of older workers. For a discussion on the implications of the earnings test for the labor
supply behavior of older workers, see Baker and Benjamin (1999), Burtless and Moﬃt (1984), Disney and Tanner (2000),
Friedberg (1998), and Gruber and Orszag (2000).
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wage of wso earn total income wso + δηwy. However, old workers who do not search and/or find jobs
retain their entire benefits, ηwy. The long-term unemployed (who will receive a current wage of wuo if
they find a job) are not eligible for benefits since they have not paid into the system when young.
Transfer payments are financed by payroll taxes (τ), assumed to be imposed equally on both firms
and matched workers. The same tax rate also applies to pension benefits. For example, an old worker
who retained her job earns a total after-tax income of (1− τ)(weo + δηwy).
Aside from these pension programs, we also incorporate stylized aspects of several alternative policy
options [“active labor market policies”]: a) a subsidy to search activity among older workers [reduces
search costs by the old by a proportion τ s and provides old workers with easier access to the labor
market], b) worker training programs [those designed to increase the accumulation of firm-specific
human capital by the proportion, τh], and c) job creation programs [lowers the costs of firm entry by
a proportion τa]. Analysis of these policies is postponed until Section 5. Finally, we assume that the
government balances its budget each period.
3.4 Workers’ Payoﬀs
We begin by computing the stationary ex-ante expected payoﬀs in utility terms to the diﬀerent types
of workers. Let Jy denote the expected lifetime utility accruing to a worker who decides to search
when young, Jeo the expected utility of an old worker who begins the period employed and continues
his employment, Juo the expected utility of an old worker who did not get matched when young and is
back in the labor market seeking employment, and Jso the expected utility of an old separated worker
who is again seeking employment. Then, it is easy to see that
Jy = −s+ α [(1− τ)wy + (1− b)βJeo + bβJso ] + (1− α)βJuo (1)
Juo = −s (1− τ s) + α(1− τ)wuo ; Jeo = (1− τ) [weo + δηwy] (2)
Jso = −s (1− τ s) + α[(1− τ) {wso + δηwy}] + (1− α) (1− τ)ηwy, (3)
where τ s ∈ [0, 1] is a possible subsidy to searching available only to old agents without jobs.
It is instructive to explore the economic interpretation of eq. (1), as the explanations of the other
value functions follow straightforwardly. A young worker seeking employment incurs an upfront cost s.
Upon entering the labor market, he gets matched with a firm with a probability α. In that case, he gets
his after-tax wage (1− τ)wy and also the expected continuation payoﬀs from possible employment and
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separation the following period. If he is unsuccessful in finding a job, he will find himself in the state of
being unemployed at the start of the following period. In passing, notice that in general, Juo 6= Jso will
hold only because governmental transfer payments will be tied to past earnings. From (1), it is also clear
that the value of a job to a young worker is much more than just the after-tax current wage. Because
jobs are potentially durable, a match today bestows certain continuation privileges to the worker, a fact
that will play a prominent role during the wage-bargaining phase.
3.5 Payoﬀs to firms
Firms begin each period in one of two possible states. They may have a vacancy, or they may be
matched with an old worker from a previous employment relationship and will have a vacancy the
following period. Letting Πv (Πf ) be the expected lifetime profits of a firm that has an unfilled (filled)
vacancy at the beginning of the period, the following equations describe the associated expected present
discounted profits of a firm in each state:
Πv = −a (1− τa) + θu˜y {[p− (1− τh)h− (1 + τ)wy] + (1− b)βΠf + bβΠv}+ θu˜s [p− (1− τh)h− (1 + τ)wso + βΠv
(4)
+θu˜o {[p− (1− τh)h− (1 + τ)wuo ] + βΠv}+ (1− θ)βΠv
Πf = p− (1 + τ)weo + βΠv (5)
Note that the firm does not incur any hiring costs if the employment relationship from the previous
period is retained. As described earlier, τa and τh ∈ [0, 1] represent potential subsidies to firms for job
posting costs and hiring costs respectively. Firms take the proportions, u˜y, u˜s and u˜o, as given when
deciding whether to enter the labor market.22
The following expression for steady state payoﬀ to entry will be of considerable use below:
Πv =
−a (1− τa) + θu˜y [p− (1− τh)h− (1 + τ)wy] + θu˜y(1− b)β [p− (1 + τ)weo]£
1− θu˜y(1− b)β2 − θu˜y(1− b)bβ2 − θu˜sβ − θu˜oβ − (1− θ)β
¤ (6)
+
θu˜o [p− (1− τh)h− (1 + τ)wuo ] + θu˜s [p− (1− τh)h− (1 + τ)wso]£
1− θu˜y(1− b)β2 − θu˜y(1− b)bβ2 − θu˜sβ − θu˜oβ − (1− θ)β
¤ .
3.6 Matching
Unemployed workers and unfilled vacancies are brought together each period through a stochastic match-
ing technology.23 The matching technology describes the total number of matches, m = µM(U,Fv),
22Expressions for u˜y, u˜s and u˜o are derived in Appendix A.
23Recall that U is the mass of unemployed workers and Fv is the total mass of unfilled vacancies at the beginning of
period t.
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that are formed at the beginning of each period, depending on the total masses of unemployed workers
and unfilled vacancies. Since α represents the probability that an unemployed worker will find any
vacancy in the time period and θ is the probability that any unfilled vacancy will find an unemployed
worker, it follows that the total number of workers who find employment (α · U) must equal the total
number of firms that filled their vacancies (θ · Fv): α · U = θ · Fv. It is important to note that α and θ
are determined in equilibrium, and that both workers and firms take them as given when making their
decisions. Noting that m = θ · Fv, we have
αU = θFv = m = µM(U,Fv) (7)
the matching condition. It is standard to assume that the matching technology takes the Cobb-Douglas
form: m = µ(U)φ(Fv)1−φ where φ ∈ [0, 1). An increase in either the number of unemployed workers
or unfilled vacancies increases the number of matches each period, but at a decreasing rate. Ceteris
paribus, more matches occur when µ is higher.
3.7 Bargaining and Wage Determination
The friction inbuilt into the job-firm matching process creates the possibility that a firm may remain
unproductive or a worker may remain unemployed in any period. Firms and workers must therefore
weigh the implications of finding themselves in these states and their outside options when bargaining
over their share of current and future surplus produced. Two important things deserve mention here.
First, the outside options available to workers are crucially aﬀected by policy, and second, these outside
options are dependent on past employment history and on one’s position in the lifecycle. Below, we
will demonstrate the powerful implications of this last observation. To foreshadow, we will establish
the presence of a “skewness” in bargaining power towards the young, and the role played by pension
programs in “undoing” some of the resultant inequities.
We now turn to the determination of the wage oﬀer functions for both young and old workers.
Matches between workers and unfilled vacancies leads to a surplus that is to be divided between the
worker and the firm. Nash bargaining dictates that the total match surplus be shared by the firm and
the worker; we denote the bargaining weight of the worker by λ, and that of the firm by 1−λ. For an old
worker with an unbroken employment relationship from the previous period, the gain from the match
is (1− τ) [weo + δηwy]− (1− τ) ηwy. The corresponding gain to the firm is p− (1+ τ)weo+βΠv−βΠv =
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p− (1 + τ)weo.24 Then, Nash bargaining implies
weo =
λp+ (1− λ) (1− δ) (1− τ) ηwy
(1− λ) (1− τ) + λ(1 + τ) . (8)
Analogously, it follows that the wages to an old separated worker is given by
wso =
λ [p− (1− τh)h] + (1− λ) (1− δ) (1− τ) ηwy
(1− λ) (1− τ) + λ(1 + τ) , (9)
and the wages to an old never-before-employed worker (one who has never paid in to the system) is
given by
wuo =
λ [p− (1− τh)h]
(1− λ) (1− τ) + λ(1 + τ) . (10)
Finally, we turn to the wage determination for a young worker. The gains from trade for the firm
are given by
p− (1− τh)h− (1 + τf )wy + bβΠv + (1− b)βΠf − βΠv
=
h
p− (1− τh)h− (1 + τ f )wy
i
+ (1− b)β
h
p− (1 + τf )weo
i
− (1− b)β(1− β)Πv
while the young worker’s surplus from finding employment is given by
(1− τ)wy + bβJso + (1− b)βJeo − βJuo
Under non-symmetric bargaining, it follows that wy may be determined using
(1− λ)

 wy [(1− τ) + bβ (αδ + 1− α) (1− τ)η + (1− b)βδ(1− τ)η]
+βs (1− τ s) (1− b) + β(1− τ) {αbwso + (1− b)weo − αwuo}

 (11)
= λ
hn
p− (1− τh)h− (1 + τf )wy
o
+ (1− b)β
n
p− (1 + τf )weo
o
− (1− b)β(1− β)Πv
i
3.7.1 Discussion of the wage function for the young
In order to derive additional insight from this wage function, it is instructive to focus on some special
cases. Assume for the present that the subsidies, τa = τh = τ s = 0, and that the firm and the worker
have equal bargaining power. A few special cases are studied below.
No policy intervention: Suppose public pension programs are absent. In this case, using (8)-
(11), we have:
wso = wuo = λ (p− h) , weo = λp
24We assume that even when a match survives on to the second period, wages are determined by a fresh process of
bargaining at the start of the second period.
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wy = λ (p− h)− (1− λ)(1− b)βweo + λ(1− b)β(p− weo) + (1− λ) (1− b)βJuo
−λ(1− b)β(1− β)Πv
Note that since a worker can expect that his job will last beyond one period, the wage function for
young workers reflects that the value of a job today is more than just the current wage. If the worker
lived exactly for one period (or employment is only temporary, b = 1), he would earn λ (p− h) , which
is his share of the current surplus he produces. However, employment when young also implies that a
worker is more likely to be working when old; this will aﬀect current wages. The term βweo represents
the additional surplus that a young worker will obtain in the future if the match is sustained. Since this
represents a source of gain from working when young, the firm extracts this future surplus by paying
the worker lower wages. In addition, if the employment relationship is sustained, then the firm will have
more net revenues next period. Since the discounted surplus, β(p−weo), represents additional revenues
that the firm will obtain in the future from hiring a young worker, the worker is able to extract his
share of that expected surplus λ(1− b)β(p − weo). In fact, the future match surplus will be higher due
to the accumulation of firm-specific human capital. It turns out that, under symmetric bargaining, the
worker’s share of the firm’s expected discounted surplus from remaining matched the next period is the
same as the firm’s share of the worker’s expected surplus so that:
wy = λ (p− h) + (1− λ) (1− b)βJuo − λ(1− b)β(1− β)Πv
It is apparent that, in the absence of policy intervention, inequities in bargaining power over the
lifecycle arise. Young workers, who have the option of searching for jobs when old, will have a higher
threat point in negotiating over wages than old workers. However, due to the accumulation of firm-
specific human capital, old workers who have retained their jobs earn higher wages than young workers.
100% tax on pension benefits for an old worker (δ = 0): In this case, social security acts as
a form of long-term unemployment insurance for older workers.25 If δ = 0, using (8)-(11), we have:
(1− τ)weo = (1− τ)λ(p+ (1− τ)ηwy)
(1− τ)wso = (1− τ)λ[(p− h) + (1− τ)ηwy]; (1− τ)wuo = (1− τ)λ(p− h)
25There are numerous cases of 100% tax rates on pension benefits in public pension programs. Recall that Mulligan and
Sala-i-Martin (1999) find that a majority of countries require individuals to retire in order to collect pension benefits. The
United States, between 1939 and 1971, is another such example. For further details, see Mulligan (1998).
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(1−τ)wy = (1−τ)[
λ(p− h) + (1− λ)βJuo − (1− λ)bβ{−s+ α(1− τ)wso}− λ(1− b)β(1− β)Πv
2λ+ λbβ(1− α)(1− τ)η ] (12)
These wage equations show how the pension system acts as a form of “unemployment insurance” for
older workers. In our setup, it also provides them with a mechanism with which they can “negotiate”
higher wages. Social security provides older workers with an independent source of income, and more
importantly, one that is not available to young workers. Under the very strict “retirement” test or
“earnings” test here, an old worker who earns any income in the labor market will completely forfeit
their retirement benefits. This implies a very large tax on elderly work and therefore old workers require
higher wages to oﬀset the loss of retirement income. Interestingly, the provision of public pension benefits
may serve a key social function by reducing inequities in bargaining power over the lifecycle and lowering
payroll costs from employing young workers.
To see how social security achieves redistribution of bargaining power over the lifecycle, recall that
young workers (by virtue of the fact that they have a period ahead of them) have higher bargaining
power than the old. Also recall that the very state of being employed when young makes individuals
eligible for governmental transfers when old. In a world with positive replacement rates, being employed
when young therefore raises the worker’s expected net income in the future. When bargaining, the firm
and the worker take this into account. The firm extracts its share of the discounted net income,
(1 − λ)bβ{−s + α(1 − τ)wso}, by paying the young worker lower wages [see eq. (12)]. The bargaining
power of the young (arising from their position in the lifecycle) is therefore partially reduced because
the firm is aware that having a job today implies current (and future) benefits to the employee; the firm
naturally extracts part of that surplus. It is in this sense that public pensions redistribute bargaining
power from young to old workers.26
No Earnings Test (δ = 1): In this case, there is no tax on pension benefits while individuals earn
labor income, and as a result, wages of old workers are unaﬀected:
(1− τ)wuo = (1− τ)wso =
(1− τ) (p− h)
2
(1− τ)weo =
(1− τ)p
2
26Black (1987) also finds that social security aﬀects age-earnings profiles. In his model, workers would rather receive
private pension payments than wages as a result of social security taxes. As workers become older, they switch from
pension payments to wages since the returns from pension savings would be lower. Therefore, social security tends to
generate upward-sloping age earnings profiles. In his work, the retirement date is exogenous (he does not explore the early
retirement incentives in the social security system). In addition, there is no unemployment in his model.
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(1− τ)wy =
(1− τ)[(p− h) + (1− b)βJuo − (1− b)β(1− β)Πv]
2 + βη(1− τ)
To gain some insight into the wage eﬀects from completely eliminating the earnings test, it is important
to compare old workers’ total income across diﬀerent earnings restrictions. In the case of a 100% tax
rate, old workers who retain their jobs obtain the total income of (1− τ)weo = (1− τ)λ(p+(1− τ)ηwy).
In contrast, when the earnings test is completely eliminated, their total income is (1− τ)(weo + ηwy) =
(1− τ)λp+η(1− τ)wy. Thus, for a given tax rate and wy, total income is higher when the earnings test
is completely eliminated. Similar insights occur when considering displaced workers. Although pension
benefits do not aﬀect the wages of old (and were employed when young) workers, their total incomes
will be higher in the case of no earnings restriction. There are also important implications for young
wages. By working and paying social security taxes when young, workers become eligible for benefits
when they are old. Since workers will obtain higher total income when work disincentives are reduced,
young workers choose to work for lower wages. Thus, the design of public pension programs will have
an important impact on age-earnings profiles in the economy. By aﬀecting the wage structure across
the lifecycle, public pension programs will have a number of general equilibrium eﬀects on labor market
activity.
3.8 Government budget
The two sources of revenue for the government are the payroll taxes paid by all the firms:
Fvθu˜oτwuo + Fvθu˜yτwy + Ffτweo + Fvθu˜sτwso (13)
and the payroll taxes paid by the diﬀerent categories of workers:
eoτ [weo + δηwy] + usατ [wso + δηwy] + us (1− α) τηwy + uoατwuo + (0.5)ατwy. (14)
where eo is the number of old people with jobs. The expenditure by the government on workers in the
form of pension payments or age-related transfers is given by
eoδηwy + usαδηwy + us (1− α) ηwy. (15)
The government also potentially finances various subsidies (search subsidies to older workers and entry
and hiring subsidies to firms):
(us + uo) sτ s + Fvaτa + θFvhτh
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It is assumed that the government balances its budget each period. Note that wages of all workers, the
total number of vacancies (along with filled vacancies), and the total number of workers in each state
(separated, employed, and unemployed) are all endogenous variables along with the taxes required to
balance the government’s budget. In particular, as demonstrated in Section 3.7, the wage functions are
functions of the tax rates and government policies.
3.9 Equilibrium
Henceforth we focus exclusively on time-invariant equilibria. This will allow us to investigate the
properties of long-run equilibria in the labor market. A steady-state equilibrium with complete labor
market participation is formally defined below.
Definition A A steady-state equilibrium with complete labor market participation consists of
wage functions w∗y, we∗o , wu∗o , and ws∗o [defined in (8)-(11)], policy parameters, τ , η, δ, τa, τh, and τ s,
exogenously specified bargaining weights λ and (1 − λ) for the firm and the worker, and a quadruple
(α∗, θ∗, U∗, F ∗v ) satisfying the following conditions: (i) Nash bargaining; (ii) (Unrestricted Entry for
firms): Π∗v = 0 ; (iii) (Steady-State): α∗U∗ = θ∗F ∗v = µM(U∗, F ∗v ); (iv) the government’s budget is
balanced, and (v) labor market participation constraints hold: Juo > 0, Jy > βJuo , (Jso , Jeo ) > (1− τ)ηwy.
The aforementioned steady state matching condition and equilibrium entry condition for firms is
derived below.
3.9.1 The Steady-State Matching Condition
Recall [see (7)] that the matching condition for the economy is given by
αU = θFv = m = µ(U)φ(Fv)1−φ
where φ ∈ [0, 1]. Noting that U/Fv = θ/α, we may therefore write the steady-state matching condition
as:
θ =
"
µ
(α)φ
# 1
1−φ
(16)
Note that the steady-state matching condition implicitly defines a relationship between α and θ consis-
tent with steady-state values for U and Fv.
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3.9.2 The Equilibrium Entry Condition
Firms enter the labor market in search of employees until all profit opportunities from new jobs are
driven to zero. This “free-entry condition” dictates that the expected present value of future profits
attributable to filling the marginal vacancy must equal the cost of vacancy-posting and hiring the next
worker. Utilizing the wage functions described above, along with Π∗v = 0 [see (6)], we have
³a
θ
´ 1
u˜y
(1− τa) = [p− (1− τh)h− (1 + τ)wy] + (1− b)β [p− (1 + τ)weo] (17)
+
µ
u˜o
u˜y
¶
[p− (1− τh)h− (1 + τ)wuo ] +
µ
u˜s
u˜y
¶
[p− (1− τh)h− (1 + τ)wso]
Then, equilibrium values of (α, θ) are derived jointly from (16) and (17).
In order to derive the endogenous market participation decisions of all workers in the presence of
policy action, we adopt the following algorithm. We conjecture an equilibrium (see Definition A) in
which all workers (especially, the old workers) choose to participate in the labor market. We then identify
a set of policy parameters will support this conjectured steady-state equilibrium. In other words, we
isolate policy parameter values for which Juo > 0, Jy > βJuo and (Jso , Jeo ) > ((1− τ)ηwy, (1− τ)ηwy) will
hold. It is apparent, for example, that for some levels of pension benefits, a separated old worker will
find it in his best interest to withdraw from the labor market; obviously, under these policy parameters,
the conjectured equilibrium will no longer be supported. In short, we allow for individual deviations
from the equilibrium path under the conjecture that all others are playing the equilibrium strategy, and
then check that any such individual deviations do not make anyone better oﬀ.27 We report the results
of our numerical exercises below.
3.10 Numerical Experiments in the Benchmark Model
In a similar model with exogenous labor market participations and no government policies, Bhattacharya
and Reed (2001) formally prove the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. The non-linearities
in the steady-state matching condition (condition (iii) in the definition of the equilibrium) and the
government budget constraint (condition (iv)) in the current setup make it impossible to obtain general
closed-form solutions for each variable. In addition, for each candidate equilibrium, the participation
27However, computation of the expected returns to deviation requires us to know the tax rates and other endogenous
variables that workers will face in the oﬀ-equilibrium path. Since a worker is of zero measure, his actions cannot have any
eﬀect on aggregate variables. This allows us to use the tax rates and other endogenous variables under the conjectured
equilibrium to compute the deviation payoﬀs.
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constraints for the endogenous labor market participation decisions also need to be checked. In what
follows, we conduct some numerical experiments aimed at providing qualitative insights into the eﬀects
of various labor market policies. We fix the values of the following parameters to: β = 0.9, s = 0.1,
a = 0.2, µ = 0.4, φ = 0.5, b = 0.3, p = 1 and h = 0.3.28 Starting from this benchmark set of parameters,
we vary a pension-policy parameter of interest in isolation so as to gain some insight into the eﬀect of
each factor on aggregate labor market outcomes. For future reference, we define the implicit tax rate as
(1− δ)(1− τ)ηwy
δ(1− τ)ηwy + (1− τ)wso
This is the implicit tax rate on earnings imposed on separated workers; (1 − δ)(1 − τ)ηwy is amount
of after-tax benefits that a separated worker would have received if he chose not to work while δ(1 −
τ)ηwy + (1− τ)wso is a separated worker’s total after-tax income (which includes her pension benefits,
δ(1 − τ)ηwy). This is an upper-bound for the actual implicit tax rate, since retained workers earn a
higher wage than separated workers. 29
3.10.1 Varying the replacement rate under symmetric bargaining weights for a fixed
earnings penalty rate
We first study the eﬀects of publicly provided pension programs within the context of symmetric Nash
bargaining, i.e., we set λ = 0.5. We begin by considering a case where there is a very high tax on
elderly work— in this setting, public pension programs are more like a form of long-term unemployment
insurance for older workers.
High penalty rate To be specific, we evaluate the consequences of varying the replacement rate η
for a fixed value of δ = 0.1 (corresponding to a 90% penalty rate). Figure 1 summarizes the results. We
note that under our set of parameters, workers of all ages and employment histories choose to participate
in the labor market when the replacement rate is 81% or lower. When public pension programs become
too generous, the displaced older workers choose to accept pension benefits rather than incur the costs
of job search, thereby destroying the conjectured equilibrium.
28To reiterate, ours is not intended to be a fully-developed calibration exercise. While it would no doubt be interesting to
extend our framework to many-period OG models, this is not our focus here. The two period framework allows us to easily
trace an old worker’s current employment status to his previous job history. It therefore provides a relatively tractable
framework to analytically demonstrate some important interactions between the design of public pension programs and
age-earnings profiles in the economy. The numerical exercises illustrate the general equilibrium eﬀects of such policies.
The two period framework provides a means towards providing a departure from standard infinite-horizon models of the
labor market. Thus, our parameter choices are not guided by the dictums of proper calibration; there is little available
knowledge on these parameters over a 25-30 year horizon, the real life length equivalent of a two-period OG model.
29Gruber and Wise (1999) find that the implicit tax rate for older workers varies across countries: while it is relatively
low in the United States (around 20%), it is much higher in a number of European countries (as much as 80%).
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In this example (δ = 0.1), we find that public pensions lead to less demand for labor and therefore
more unemployment in the economy (lower values of α, higher values of θ, and F (the total mass of
firms) lower). This is primarily because pension programs raise payroll costs. At higher values of η, old
workers who were employed when young become eligible for higher transfer payments — this raises their
bargaining power, wages, and total (wages gross of pensions) incomes.30 Consequently, the gains from
working when young become higher and young workers therefore accept lower wages. Under higher
replacement rates, the tax rate needed to finance the pension program rises to nearly 3%. As a result,
labor costs (on average) increase, and the total number of firms (F) falls. As pension benefits become
more generous and workers face more diﬃculty in finding employment (α lower), more old workers in
the economy stay unemployed, and therefore, the young are a smaller share of the unemployed in the
economy. The combination of high payroll tax rates, a severe earnings restriction, and high replacement
rates raises the the implicit tax rate on elderly earnings to nearly 50% for old and displaced workers.
Eventually, as replacement rates continue to rise, old displaced workers find it in their best interest to
retire rather than search for employment — the equilibrium under complete labor market participation
fails to exist.
Low penalty rate The second experiment focuses on the eﬀects of higher replacement rates when the
earnings restriction is much less severe (the earnings penalty rate is only 10%, i.e., δ = 0.9). In many
ways, the results are qualitatively similar to the analysis in the first experiment. We find, however, that
the equilibrium of complete labor market participation continues to exist for replacement rates through
100%. That is, when the earnings penalty is in place, but relatively mild, public pension programs fail
to induce retirement. We present the results of our numerical simulations in Figure 2.
As before, higher replacement rates are associated with higher wages for old workers eligible for
benefits. Due to the much lower implicit tax rates on elderly work, the increase in wages associated
with more generous benefits is lower since old workers do not lose as much additional income by choosing
to work rather than retire. We do find, however, that (for a given replacement rate) the total income
of old employed and separated workers is higher when δ is higher.
What is the eﬀect on young workers’ wages? Since working and contributing to the pension system
when young makes workers eligible for higher expected total income when old, a lower earnings tax on
30 In fact, because of the severe earnings restrictions, the choice of working when old implies higher foregone pension
benefits and therefore lower net income from working. As a result, retained and separated old workers are able to extract
the loss of benefits from their employers in the form of higher wages. Thus higher pension benefits and higher wages cause
total income of old workers to rise.
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old income further raises the benefits of employment in the first period and tends to lower young workers’
wages. Two general equilibrium eﬀects oﬀset this. First, lower old workers’ wages entice more firms
to create vacancies which allows workers to find vacancies more easily – this also raises the outside
option (to working) for young workers. Second, the higher tax rates required to finance the higher
pension benefits under a more lax earnings restriction will prompt young workers to demand higher
wages. Overall, our results imply that for a fixed replacement rate, wages of the young are higher under
a lower earnings restriction. As the replacement rate rises, young workers will accept lower wages since
employment makes them eligible for future higher pension benefits.
The Earnings Test and its Implications Given the recent attention on the earnings test, a study
of the eﬀects of removing it, seems in order.31 When there is no earnings restriction, the implicit tax
rate on elderly work falls to zero; as such, old-age wages are no longer related to the replacement rate.
The generosity of the pension programs, however, does aﬀect young workers’ wages since the higher
benefits will raise workers’ overall incomes when they reach old age. Not surprisingly, more generous
pension programs require higher tax rates. The eﬀects of increasing generosity of benefits with no
earnings penalty are illustrated in Figure 3.
Our discussion thus far has highlighted an important eﬀect of the earnings test, namely lower
employment. Recall, under the earnings test, higher replacement rates imply higher payroll costs
for old workers (more generous pension benefits translate into higher bargaining power for the old)
that dominate the lower cost of young workers’ wages, thereby reducing aggregate employment. In
the absence of an earnings test, as pension programs become more generous, the payroll costs of old
workers rise (although old-wages remain constant) and the payroll costs of young workers fall. At low
replacement rates, increasing benefits leads to less employment; however, as the replacement rate rises,
it turns out that the amount of employment may eventually rise [a point where the aforementioned
fall in payroll costs of young workers may dominate the increase in costs of employing old workers.]
As Figure 3 demonstrates, we have uncovered a non-monotonic relationship between total employment
and replacement rates of pension benefits (as observed in the relationships among α, θ, F and η).
Furthermore, this non-monotonicity is present only when the earnings test is absent.
31For a discussion on the implications of the earnings test for the labor supply behavior of older workers, see Baker and
Benjamin (1999), Burtless and Moﬃt (1984), Disney and Tanner (2000), Friedberg (1998), and Gruber and Orszag (2000).
While these papers have examined the implications of social security design on individual labor market outcomes, our work
seeks to determine their overall impact on the labor market at the aggregate level in a general equilibrium setting.
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Summary We briefly summarize our main results on the design of public pension programs in the
case of symmetric Nash bargaining. In general, more generous provision of pension benefits (higher
replacement rates) raises total incomes of workers who are eligible for benefits. When there is a high
tax on elderly work (the earnings test is relatively more severe), the increase in bargaining power
resulting from the availability of benefits raises wages for retained and separated workers. When there
is a low tax on elderly work (the earnings test is relatively less severe), there is less of an eﬀect on
old workers’ wages, but the increase in pension benefits raises their total incomes. The availability of
pension benefits will also causes young workers’ wages to fall. In terms of maximizing employment
(maximizing F), our results imply that as long as publicly induced retirement does not occur, the best
pension program is one that does not tax elderly work (for a given replacement rate). Thus, for any
replacement rate, the best pension program is to eliminate the earnings test. However, the best pension
program (the combination of δ and η) for maximizing employment in the economy, is one with zero
replacement rates – i.e., the pension program that generates the most employment is to not have a
pension program.
3.10.2 Varying the replacement rate when workers have a higher bargaining weight
We now proceed to studying the eﬀects of public pension programs when workers have relatively more
bargaining power than firms, a feature of many European labor markets. For brevity, we report only
on how the results diﬀer across λ = 0.5 and λ = 0.6.
High penalty rate (δ = 0.1) We present the numerical results in Figure 4. When the replacement
rate (η) increases from 0 to 54%,
1. Old workers’ wages respond slightly more to higher replacement rates in the symmetric Nash case
than when workers have more bargaining power.
2. This pattern also holds for the total after-tax income of retained workers. However, it is not true
for the displaced workers. In the case of symmetric Nash bargaining, separated workers will see
their incomes rise almost two and half times their income without public pensions. The increase
is much higher (over three times) when workers have more bargaining power. Recall that social
security acts as a form of long-term unemployment insurance by providing displaced older workers
with a source of income in the event that they do not find employment. As a result, especially
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when the penalty rate is high, displaced workers experience a greater increase in after-tax income
than old workers who retain jobs from their youth.
3. When λ= 0.6, there is a greater role for such insurance due to the higher amount of unemployment.
As a result, public pension programs have a stronger labor supply eﬀect than under symmetric
Nash bargaining. The replacement rate does not need to be as high (only to η = 0.54 < .81) in
order to induce separated workers to retire. This observation suggests that social security-type
policies should have a stronger impact on labor supply decisions in European countries than in
the United States.
4. Taxes rise more when workers have higher bargaining strength because there is more unemploy-
ment and the base for calculating benefits (wy) is higher. Consequently, young workers’ wages fall
more under symmetric Nash.
Low penalty rate (δ = 0.9) We present the numerical results in Figure 5.
1. Eﬀect on old retained workers: Recall that in the symmetric Nash case, higher replacement
rates translate into higher wages for old retained workers: they forego some pension benefits by
working but the implicit tax rate is quite low. In contrast, under higher worker bargaining power,
wages of old retained workers actually fall. In this case, there is a relatively small loss of income
from working due to the low tax on elderly work (the earnings penalty is only 10%). But, with
workers gaining a larger share of the total surplus from working, the tax rate required to pay for
the increased pension benefits is now higher. This reduces the firm’s gains from having a filled
vacancy. As a result, old workers with long-term labor market attachment experience a fall in
wages. Regardless, the higher replacement rate is associated with higher total income since the
loss in wages is small compared to the increase in pension income under higher replacement rates.
The increase in total income is slightly less than when λ = 0.5.
2. Eﬀect on old separated workers: As in the symmetric Nash case, these workers experience a small
increase in wages.
3. Also, we find that wages of the long-term unemployed fall when workers have more bargaining
power, but remain constant under symmetric Nash bargaining. In the symmetric Nash case, an
increase in the tax rate simultaneously lowers the gains from trade for both the firm and the
worker in the same amount; in the case where workers have more bargaining power, their wage
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depends more on the firm’s surplus than their own gains from trade. Thus, the wage paid to
the long-term unemployed depends more on the firm’s net revenues from filling their employment
vacancy and therefore the higher tax rate causes their wage to fall.
4. Taxes are somewhat higher and employment falls more when workers have more bargaining power.
Despite the fall in employed workers’ wages and of the long-term unemployed, payroll costs behave
qualitatively the same as under symmetric Nash. Payroll costs from employment of young workers
fall more under symmetric Nash, but increase more for all other employment relationships—despite
the fact that taxes rise more when λ=.6. Figure 6 reports the results when the earnings test is
completely eliminated.
4 Policy-Induced Withdrawal from the Labor Force Among “Dis-
couraged” Workers
The benchmark model studied a setting where independent of age and employment history, all workers
chose to participate voluntarily in the labor market. En route to studying the desirability (or lack
thereof) of policies that induce workers of all ages and employment histories to participate, we now
analyze a setting where a subset of workers are induced to drop out. In particular, we consider the
general equilibrium consequences of public policies that induce only the old and separated [hereafter,
“discouraged”] workers to leave the labor market.32 Recall, these are old workers who were employed
when young, paid into the system, were involuntarily displaced from their jobs, and are currently eligible
for pension benefits.33
In terms of deriving the endogenous labor market participation decisions of all workers (in particular,
old workers), we adopt the following algorithm. We first condition on a set of strategies where all
separated workers have chosen to withdraw from the labor market (rather than incur costs of job search).
We then ask what set of policy parameters will support the conjectured steady-state equilibrium. That
32 In Britain, “the Job Release Scheme which ran between 1977 and 1988, specifically encouraged older workers to
stand down to make way for younger ones. Once out of employment, changes to the unemployment benefit regime in 1983
removed the requirement for men over 60 to look for work, encouraging them to see themselves as retired.” Mulligan (2000)
discusses a number of explanations for the design of social security programs. Based on his analysis, he determines that
public pension programs emphasize both induced retirement and intergenerational income redistribution. In particular, he
finds the induced retirement objectives are much more important in Europe.
33“In the past 20 years, the proportion of men between 50 and the State Pension Age (65 for men) who are not working
has doubled. A third of men and women in this age range, 2.8 million people, are now not working. ...Almost half receive
most of their income in state benefits.... The total economic cost is high. The drop in work rates among the over-50s since
1979 costs the economy about £16 billion a year in lost GDP and costs the public purse £3-5 billion in extra benefits and
lost taxes.”
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is, within the context of the conjectured strategies of withdrawal by discouraged workers, we then verify
that under the given set of policy parameters a separated worker is better oﬀ choosing to collect pension
benefits rather than searching for a job.34
4.1 Payoﬀs
To save on space, we quickly summarize the relevant expressions that are analogues of similar expressions
from the benchmark model. First, workers who did not find employment when young, under our
equilibrium, search when old and receive
Juo = −s (1− τ s) + α(1− τ)wuo > 0
as in (2) above. The conjectured equilibrium is that discouraged workers do not search implying
Jso = (1− τ)ηwy.
Under the conjectured equilibrium, firms do not have access to the pool of old separated workers.
This implies that
Πv = −a (1− τa) + θu˜y {[p− (1− τh)h− (1 + τ)wy] + (1− b)βΠf + bβΠv}
+θu˜o {[p− (1− τh)h− (1 + τ)wuo ] + βΠv}+ (1− θ)βΠv
and
Πf = p− (1 + τ)weo + βΠv
Then, analogous to (6), we get
Πv =
−a (1− τa) + θu˜y [p− (1− τh)h− (1 + τ)wy] + θu˜y(1− b)β [p− (1 + τ)weo]£
1− θu˜y(1− b)β2 − θu˜y(1− b)bβ2 − θu˜oβ − (1− θ)β
¤
+
θu˜o [p− (1− τh)h− (1 + τ)wuo ]£
1− θu˜y(1− b)β2 − θu˜y(1− b)bβ2 − θu˜oβ − (1− θ)β
¤
The wage functions, derived in exactly the same manner as in the benchmark model, and analogous
to (8)-(11) are collected below:
wuo =
λ [p− (1− τh)h]
(1− λ) (1− τ) + λ(1 + τ) (18)
34Pissarides (1976), in an infinite-horizon model with sequential search, also studies the choice of labor market partici-
pation. He derives the optimal number of times individuals will choose to search for jobs before becoming “discouraged”
and withdrawling from the labor market. He does not consider, however, the role of the lifecycle in his analysis. His model
also does not address how labor market participation is determined by labor market policies.
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weo =
λp+ (1− λ) (1− δ) (1− τ) ηwy
(1− λ) (1− τ) + λ(1 + τ) (19)
The gains to a firm from hiring a young worker is given by
p− (1− τh)h− (1 + τf )wy + bβΠv + (1− b)βΠf − βΠv
which simplifies to
p− (1− τh)h− (1 + τ)wy − β(1− b)(1− β)Πv + (1− b)β [p− (1 + τ)weo]
The young worker’s surplus from finding employment is given by
(1− τ)wy + bβJso + (1− b)βJeo − βJuo
which simplifies to
(1− τ)wy + bβ [(1− τ)ηwy] + (1− b)β [(1− τ)weo + δ(1− τ)ηwy]− β [−s+ α(1− τ)wuo ]
Under non-symmetric bargaining, we have
λ {p− (1− τh)h− (1 + τ)wy − β(1− b)(1− β)Πv + (1− b)β [p− (1 + τ)weo]}
= (1− λ) {(1− τ)wy + bβ(1− τ)ηwy + (1− b)β [weo(1− τ) + δ(1− τ)ηwy]− β [−s (1− τ s) + αwno (1− τ)]}
Under free entry, the expression for the wages of a young worker may be written as:
wy =
λ [{p− (1− τh)h}+ (1− b)β {p− (1 + τ)weo}]
(1− λ) [(1− τ) + (1− b)βδη(1− τ) + βb(1− τ)η] + λ(1 + τ) (20)
− (1− λ) [(1− b)β(1− τ)weo − {−s (1− τ s) + α(1− τ)wuo}]
(1− λ) [(1− τ) + (1− b)βδη(1− τ) + βb(1− τ)η] + λ(1 + τ)
Firms, as before, enter until Π∗v = 0. So, in a steady-state, similar to (17), we have the “free entry”
condition given by
a
θ
µ
1
u˜y
¶
(1− τa) = [p− (1− τh)h− (1 + τ)wy] + (1− b)β [p− (1 + τ)weo] (21)
+
µ
u˜o
u˜y
¶
[p− (1 + τ)wuo − (1− τh)h]
4.2 Government
Finally, the components of the government’s budget constraint may be written as follows. The payroll
taxes paid by firms are given by
Fvθu˜oτwuo + Fvθu˜yτwy + Ffτweo
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and those paid out by workers are
0.5 · ατwy + eoτ [weo + δηwy] + αuoτwuo + rτηwy
where r stands for the number of people who withdraw from the labor force. The government spends
an amount equal to eoδηwy + rηwy + uoτ ss on workers (the last term is the search subsidy) and an
amount Fvaτa+ θFvhτh on firms (in the form of subsidies). Again, the government balances its budget
each period.
4.3 Equilibrium
A steady-state equilibrium in which all old “discouraged” workers voluntarily withdraw from the labor
market is formally defined below.
Definition B A steady-state equilibrium with no labor market participation from old displaced
workers consists of wage functions w∗y, we∗o , and wu∗o , [defined in (18)-(20)], policy parameters, τ , η, δ,
τa, τh, and τ s, exogenously specified bargaining weights λ and (1− λ) for the firm and the worker, and
a quadruple (α∗, θ∗, U∗, F ∗v ) satisfying the following conditions: (i) Nash bargaining; (ii) (Unrestricted
Entry for firms): Π∗v = 0 ; (iii) (Steady-State): α∗U∗ = θ∗F ∗v = µM(U∗, F ∗v ); (iv) the government’s
budget is balanced, and (v) labor market participation constraints: Juo > 0, Jy > βJuo , Jeo > (1− τ)ηwy
hold, and the discouraged worker constraint [see Appendix C ] is satisfied.
4.4 Numerical Experiments in the “Discouraged” Worker Economy
In what follows, we fix the values of the following parameters to the same values as those in the
benchmark model: β = 0.9, s = 0.1, a = 0.2, µ = 0.4, φ = 0.5, b = 0.3, p = 1 and h = 0.3. Starting from
this set of parameters, we vary a pension-policy parameter of interest in isolation so as to gain some
insight into the eﬀect of each factor on aggregate labor market outcomes.
In terms of deriving the endogenous retirement decision of older workers, we adopt the following
algorithm. To consider the long-run general equilibrium implications of policy-induced retirement, we
first condition on a set of strategies where all separated workers accept some level of pension benefits
and withdraw rather than incur the costs of job search and participate. We then ask, what set of
policy parameters (pension benefits) will support this conjectured equilibrium. We verify that under
the stated pension program, all separated workers are indeed better oﬀ choosing to withdraw rather
than remaining active in the labor market — this is the discouraged worker constraint in Definition B
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[for details, see Appendix C.] Importantly, if the earnings test on pension benefits is suﬃciently severe
and benefits are generous enough (high replacement rates), then a separated worker would be better oﬀ
choosing to accept pension benefits and retire rather than incur the costs of job search.
4.4.1 Varying the replacement rate under symmetric bargaining weights for a fixed earn-
ings penalty rate
We begin by considering a case where there is a very high tax on elderly work — in this setting, public
pension programs mimic long-term unemployment insurance for older workers. Our main focus is on
direct comparison between the complete market participation and the discouraged worker economies.
Our first example in which public pension programs induce retirement behavior sets λ = .5 and
studies the consequences of varying the replacement rate η for a fixed penalty rate δ = 0.1. Here, the
conjectured discouraged worker equilibrium exists starting with replacement rates equal to 81%. That
is, for replacement rates equal to and higher than 81%, all displaced workers choose to withdraw from
the labor market rather than incur the costs of job search and participate.35 It is clear that the lack
of labor market participation by the old has a significant impact on aggregate labor market outcomes.
Since there are fewer workers searching for jobs, young workers more readily find employment (α higher)
under policy-induced retirement. In this sense, the unemployment rate in the economy is lower. This,
however, does not imply that there is more employment in the economy — the number of firms that
are active in the discouraged worker economy is much lower than when there is active labor market
participation among workers from all age groups. We illustrate these results in Figure 7.
In sharp contrast to the aforementioned results from complete market participation economies,
increasing the generosity of benefits (higher replacement rates, η) produce lower unemployment rates
and more employment in the discouraged worker economies. Why? Under policy-induced withdrawal
by the old, the young are a much greater fraction of the labor force. Recall that they are also the
lowest cost workers in the economy.36 Increasing the generosity of the pension system therefore lowers
young wages and makes it more profitable for firms to enter the labor market — both an increase in
employment and a decrease in the unemployment rate. Nevertheless, even though higher replacement
rates increase employment in the discouraged worker economy, total employment would be much higher
35Recall that for the same benchmark set of parameters, the conjectured steady-state equilibrium in which all workers
choose to search for jobs (discussed in the previous section) exists for values of η = 0 through 82%. In contrast, the
discouraged worker economy exists (and there is some retirement) for values of η from 81% and higher. Thus, in this case,
for a small set of parameters (η from 81% through 82%), both equilibria exist.
36Note that because the young get access to pension benefits when old, they accept lower wages when young.
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if the replacement rate were lower and there was no policy-induced withdrawal by the old — in fact,
employment would be highest if there were no public pension programs in existence.
What is the eﬀect of policy-induced withdrawal by the old on payroll taxes? The fact that both
economies exist when η = 0.82 allows us to isolate the pure eﬀect of publicly-induced retirement on
taxes — the latter alone is responsible for taxes to jump from nearly 3% to over 4.5%, a 50% increase.
This is to be expected; after all, the tax rate on the worker and the employer is the same, and there is
less employment in the economy under publicly-induced retirement; naturally, taxes must rise. Payroll
costs under induced withdrawal are also higher — due to the increased ability of workers to find jobs,
young workers obtain higher wages, and that also raises the wages to old retained workers since they
give up more pension benefits by working. In addition, the higher taxes cause after-tax labor costs of
employment to increase.
4.4.2 Asymmetric Bargaining Weights
We present the results of this case in Figure 8. In contrast to the symmetric case with policy-induced
retirement, the long-term unemployed are a much larger part of the labor force when λ = .6. This
is consistent with observations from European labor markets in which there is much concern about
youth unemployment — young workers who experience long-term unemployment are more likely to be
unemployed when they are older.
As in the case of complete labor market participation, an important aspect of wage determination
when workers have more bargaining power is that a worker’s wage depends more on the firm’s surplus
from filling a vacancy than the worker’s surplus from obtaining employment. The higher taxes required
to pay for the higher pension benefits lower the firm’s surplus from employing any of the long-term
unemployed, thereby causing wuo to fall. As in the case where retirement does not occur, we find that
young workers’ wages do not fall as much under higher replacement rates. Due to the higher taxes
and pension benefits, the payroll costs associated with employing old workers who did not find jobs
when young are slightly higher. The payroll costs from employing retained workers are higher as well.
Only the payroll costs of employing young workers are lower. This leads to another example of a non-
monotonicity between α (which is associated with the amount of vacancy creation) and the replacement
rate. Initially, when pension programs become more generous, there is an overall increase in payroll
costs so that less firms decided to enter the market. If the replacement rate is suﬃciently high, young
workers’ wages fall enough so that overall payroll costs in the economy are lower, more job vacancies are
created, and workers find it easier to find jobs. Despite this non-monotonicity that we observe, these
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eﬀects tend to be relatively small compared to the complete labor market participation case.
Summary of the Eﬀects of Policy-Induced Retirement and Public Pension Programs
1. In both the complete participation and retirement economies, the increasing generosity of pension
programs will tend to raise old workers’ wages. However, there is less of an eﬀect when workers
have more bargaining power.
2. In contrast to the complete labor market participation case, the unemployment rate in the economy
will be lower when induced retirement occurs. Nevertheless, total employment is higher when all
workers are active in the labor market.
3. The employment response to the eﬀects of the replacement rate depends crucially on the retirement
choices of older workers. When policy-induced retirement does not occur, more generous pension
programs (assuming δ fixed) lead to less employment. Under policy-induced retirement, the
employment eﬀects of the replacement rate depend crucially on the degree of workers’ bargaining
power.
4. The labor supply response to the replacement rate is higher when workers have more bargaining
power. Retirement will be observed at lower replacement rates than in the symmetric Nash case.
This is mostly a response to the lower returns from job search by old workers due to less vacancy
creation.
5. If the replacement rate is large enough, total after-tax incomes of retained and separated workers
are higher when retirement takes place. This occurs because of the general equilibrium implications
of pension benefits: when separated workers withdraw from the labor market, this lowers the
unemployment rate in the economy and drives young workers’ wages higher. Consequently, when
the young workers become older, their pension benefits are higher since they are proportional to
their wages when they were young. Therefore, workers who are eligible for benefits obtain higher
net income under policy-induced retirement.
6. Eliminating the earnings test may further improve the income redistribution motive of social
security, encourage labor market participation among the elderly, and increase total employment.
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5 Alternative Policy Actions
In the preceding sections, we have considered the aggregate labor market implications of pension pro-
grams on the labor market. In particular, we have emphasized the general equilibrium eﬀects of policy-
induced retirement as a means of regulating labor market activity. The specific inducement studied
was one that mimiced a pension program: working individuals and productive firms were taxed and the
proceeds were used to pay enough benefits to the displaced workers so that they voluntarily withdrew
from the labor market. While pension programs of this type have been widely used (see Section 2.3,
“Retirement-Inducing Policies Around the World”) to free up jobs for the young, such policies, in the
wake of an aging population, now impose an unprecedented tax burden on the current younger genera-
tions of working individuals. In response, many countries are considering policies aimed at promoting
labor market participation by older workers.37 In this section, we seek to further evaluate how labor
market policy should be designed in light of the implications of the lifecycle for labor market outcomes.
While many governments have attempted to regulate labor market activity by manipulating (and, in
particular, reducing) the supply of labor, an alternative policy response could be to directly promote
employment rather than encouraging older workers to withdraw from the labor market. Below, we
examine if labor market policy should be designed to target specific age-groups or if it should ignore
the age-composition of the labor force.
We study a few alternative policy options which often are discussed under the rubric of “active labor
market policies”.38 One approach would be to promote labor market participation among older workers
by attempting to provide them with easier access to the labor market. In this respect, we study the
eﬀects of policies that subsidize the costs of job search [an increase in τ s] among older workers. An
alternative would be to encourage more vacancy creation and increase the demand for labor. In this
respect, we pursue two types of policies which are general and not age-targeted. The first set falls under
the umbrella of worker training programs. These eﬀectively raise the productivity of newly-created
matches. In this sense, our worker training programs are designed to increase the accumulation of
firm-specific human capital by the proportion, τh. Another policy which would increase employment
would be to subsidize job creation directly by subsidizing the costs of firm entry. These policies would
37See the discussion in OECD (1995, 1998).
38 “Active labor programs (ALPs) are common in OECD countries, and are increasingly found in transition economies and
other middle income countries that are undergoing industrial restructuring and experiencing high levels of unemployment.
Government operated ALPs typically include: job counseling and referral services, public works or community employment,
wage subsidies, small business creation programs, and retraining. The objective of these programs is to expedite the
redeployment of labor, thereby reducing the duration of frictional and structural unemployment, increasing productivity,
and reducing expenditures on income support programs.” [Fretwell, Benus, and O’Leary, 1999]
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eﬀectively lower the costs of firm entry by a proportion τa. Finally, it is important to note that
because we are interested in contrasting the eﬀects of these alternative policy options to public pension
programs, our analysis will consider the eﬀects of the subsidy to job search, worker training programs,
and employment subsidies in isolation to each other. In particular, this implies that we conduct our
analysis assuming that public pension programs are absent. This allows us to directly compare the
eﬀects of the diﬀerent policy options rather than their combined eﬀects. In particular, we also limit our
analysis to the symmetric Nash bargaining case.
We begin with the eﬀects of the programs aimed at reducing the costs of job search among older
workers. While these policies encourage labor market participation by old displaced and unemployed
workers, there are a number of oﬀsetting general equilibrium eﬀects. In particular, taxes are required to
pay for the subsidy. In addition, recall that in the absence of public pension programs, young workers
have higher bargaining power than old workers because they have another period of job search available.
By reducing the costs of job search among the old, this further raises young workers’ outside options
when bargaining and therefore raises young workers’ wages. Consequently, while the search subsidy is
designed to reduce the costs of job search, it also reduces the amount of vacancy creation since it raises
taxes and wages of young workers. Thus, the search subsidy actually causes total employment to fall.
We next consider the eﬀects of the policies aimed at promoting labor market activity through worker
training programs and employment subsidies. Worker training programs can encourage more vacancy
creation and promote labor market activity by making new matches more profitable. Because they raise
net revenues from filling vacancies, these policies also causes wages of workers in new matches to increase.
So, although worker training programs should lead to more employment, the eﬀects on employment
are relatively small. In particular, compared to eliminating the work disincentives in public pension
programs, the eﬀects in terms of encouraging more employment are very low. Employment subsidies
(by reducing the costs of posting vacancies) raise total employment in the economy, much more than
what would occur by eliminating the earnings test. However, while employment subsidies raise total
employment significantly, they play no role in terms of income redistribution.
6 “Optimal” Design of Public Pension Programs
6.1 Welfare
We consider the “optimal” design of public pension programs and other labor market policies. We do not
attempt to characterize the “first best,” but we do consider how the design of public pension programs,
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by altering wages and endogenous labor supply decisions in the economy, aﬀects aggregate welfare in
the economy. If the decision criterion is maximum employment, we find that, for any replacement
rate, the “best” pension program does not have an earnings test. However, the best pension program
(the combination of δ and η) for maximizing employment is one with zero replacement rates. A more
reasonable welfare criterion would take workers’ expected lifetime utility into account. In our economy,
we have workers of diﬀerent age groups and employment histories. Because we are concerned with the
general equilibrium eﬀects of diﬀerent patterns of labor market participation, we choose a population-
based average of expected lifetime utility of each group of workers. In particular, we adopt the following
measure of social welfare as our welfare criterion:39
W ≡ 1
2
Jy +
1
2
{α(1− b)Jeo + αbJso + (1− α)Juo }
Our first question is: is it ever welfare-improving to induce withdrawal by displaced workers from
the labor force? As Figure 9 demonstrates, we find the answer is yes — for a given earnings restriction
(for example, δ = 0.1), policy-induced retirement achieved by increasing the replacement rate may
improve aggregate labor market welfare. By eﬀectively allowing young workers to purchase jobs from
old individuals, public pension programs can improve the allocation of workers to jobs since young
workers will have a higher chance of finding long-term employment. As in many search models of the
labor market, workers here impose a congestion externality on the unemployed — for a fixed number
of vacancies, an increase in the number of workers renders it less likely that a given worker will find
a job. Furthermore, due to the possibility for the accumulation of firm-specific human capital in our
setup, allowing young workers to have a greater chance of finding employment improves the allocation
of workers to jobs in the economy.
What combinations of η and δ achieve the highest aggregate welfare? We find the following: (i) for
a given earnings test (δ fixed), increasing the generosity of public pension programs improves aggregate
welfare, and (ii) reducing the severity of the earnings test may also be welfare-enhancing. Completely
eliminating the earnings test improves the redistribution of income over the lifecycle. Furthermore, at
higher replacement rates, the drop in the payroll costs of young workers outweigh the higher costs of
employing old workers so that there is more employment as a result of the redistribution. Thus, for a
given earnings test, policy-induced retirement will improve labor market welfare. This occurs for two
reasons: (i) allocating a higher proportion of jobs towards young workers leads to a more eﬃcient allo-
cation of workers to jobs due to the accumulation of firm-specific human capital and (ii) public pension
39See Davidson et. al. (1994) for a similar welfare criterion. Also, see Azariadis (p.190).
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programs play a role in terms of redistribution of bargaining power and income across the lifecycle.
In contrast to policy-induced retirement, eliminating work disincentives in pension programs leads to
the following: (i) better income redistribution, (ii) more labor market participation, and potentially
(iii) more vacancy creation due to the eﬀect of the pension programs on age-earnings profiles in the
economy. Therefore, we illustrate that recent policy reforms aimed at reducing work disincentives to-
wards the elderly allow the redistributive role of social security to function more eﬀectively and that
the welfare eﬀects of promoting total employment may be more important than improving the quality
of employment (by encouraging the elderly to “free up” jobs for the young).
We can also use our structure to investigate the welfare eﬀects of the active labor market programs
discussed in Section 5. We find that aggregate welfare rises when there is a subsidy to vacancy creation
and costs of job market search. However, these eﬀects are much smaller than when the earnings penalty
is eliminated. In particular, although employment subsidies raise total employment in the economy, they
do not address the inequities in bargaining power and income that exist over the lifecycle. Thus, our
model implies that it may be best to confront the current demographic crisis associated with an aging
population by eliminating the current work disincentives embedded in many public pension programs.
7 Concluding Remarks
Many countries are currently experiencing a major demographic shift towards an aging population.
Alongside these changes, the age composition of the labor force is also becoming significantly older.
Labor force participation decisions further complicate these problems as workers are retiring earlier
and living much longer after retirement than their counterparts in earlier cohorts. Policymakers must
address how public pension programs and other labor market policies should be designed in reponse to
these important developments. In this context, some are calling for reduced benefits (or higher taxes)
while others are fighting to reduce the work disincentives embedded in many pension systems.
We believe that careful general equilibrium analysis of the underlying issues can shed important
light and oﬀer much needed guidance to policymakers. In this regard, we have ventured to study the
eﬃciency and desirability of publicly-funded pension programs within the context of a dynamic general
equilibrium model. In order to consider how age-targeted labor market policies such as social security
should be designed in light of the ongoing trend towards an increasingly older population, we adopted
the OG setup because it allows a natural and explicit separation of the workforce into young and old
workers. The framework captures an important inter-generational conflict between the young and old
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since they simultaneously compete for the same jobs; additionally, the bargaining power of the two
during wage negotiations are diﬀerent. Moreover, the OG structure is naturally conducive to studying
pension programs that tie in with the lifecycle and other “low frequency” aspects of the labor market,
such as, long job tenure, and the accumulation of firm-specific human capital.
We adopted the search framework in the labor market for three important reasons. First, it allows
us to endogenize both the supply side (through labor market participation choices) and the demand
side (via endogenous creation of vacancies) of the labor market, a clear departure from the “lump-of-
labor” line of thought. Second, the retirement literature suggests that social security programs help
to reduce labor market congestion problems for the young. The diminished prospects for job search
are also a prominent factor in the labor market participation decisions of older workers. Finally, the
decentralized notion of wage bargaining used in our framework allows us to study the eﬀects of public
pension programs on wage determination at each stage of the lifecycle. This is especially important
given the fact that most real-world pension program benefits are generally related in some way to the
number of years worked (and amount of taxes paid) and tend to increase with lifetime earnings. In
this context, an important new eﬀect that we identify is the role of social security in redistributing
bargaining power over the lifecycle. In our setup, younger workers have the option of waiting while
older (equally productive) workers do not. This bargaining-power inequity translates into high wages
for the young, escalating labor costs (since young workers consitute the largest pool of the unemployed
from which firms will have to find workers), and reduces firm entry. Positive replacement rates, raise the
lifetime value of working when young and thereby reduces this ineﬃciency. Our work therefore oﬀers a
positive explanation for the prevalence of social security programs around the world.40
Our research provides numerous insights into the aggregate labor market implications of the lifecycle
and public pension programs. We find that the age composition of the labor force may cause an ineﬃcient
allocation of workers to jobs in the labor market thereby creating a welfare-enhancing role for publicly
induced retirement. However, despite the potential role of social security for improving the allocation of
workers to jobs in the labor market by encouaging the elderly to “free up” jobs for the young, our work
suggests that recent policy reforms aimed at reducing work disincentives towards the elderly may be
more beneficial. This occurs for essentially three reasons. First, eliminating the earnings test allows the
redistiributive role of social security to function more eﬀectively. Second, such policies may lower overall
labor costs in the economy through their impact on age-earnings profiles. Third, it is quite possible that
aggregate labor market welfare could be improved by adopting labor market policies that simultaneously
40For a diﬀerent “positive theory” of social security, see Sala-i-Martin (1996).
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permit the redistributive function of social security to operate and increase total employment rather
than attempting to improve the quality of employment.
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Appendix
A Steady state measures of workers and firms in the baseline case
Below, we compute the steady-state measures of active firms and workers that are interacting in the
labor market. To that end, it is instructive to collect all the notation in one place. Denote by uuo,t ≡
mass of unemployed old workers at date t who did not find jobs at date t−1, uso,t ≡ mass of unemployed
old workers at date t who got separated from their jobs at date t− 1, eo,t ≡ mass of agents who found
employment at date t − 1 and are employed at the start of date t, uy,t ≡ mass of young newborn
(unemployed) agents at date t (uy,t = 12 by assumption), Ut ≡ mass of unemployed workers at the start
of date t, u˜y,t ≡
uy,t
Ut
is the probability that a given unemployed worker is young, u˜o,t ≡
uuo,t + uso,t
Ut
is the probability that a given unemployed worker is old. Also recall that αt ≡ probability that any
unemployed worker finds a vacancy, θt ≡ probability that any vacancy (firm) finds an unemployed
worker, b ≡ probability that any employed worker gets separated from his job.
Then, it follows that
Ut ≡ uuo,t + uso,t + uy,t, eo,t ≡ α(1− b)uy,t, uuo,t + uso,t + eo,t =
1
2
,
and the flow into unemployment must satisfy
Ut+1 = (1− α)uy,t + αbuy,t + uy,t+1
In a steady state then, it follows that
us =
αb
2
, uu =
(1− α)
2
, U = (1− α)
2
+
αb
2
+
1
2
=
2− α(1− b)
2
and
u˜y ≡
uy
U =
1
2− α(1− b) , u˜o ≡
uo
U =
1− α
2− α(1− b) , u˜s ≡
us
U =
αb
2− α(1− b)
Firms take u˜y and u˜o as given when making their entry decisions.
We now proceed to compute the masses of firms with and without a vacancy. Let Ft ≡ total mass
of firms in existence at the start of date t, Fv,t ≡ total mass of firms with a vacancy at start of date t,
and Ff,t ≡ total mass of firms with a filled vacancy at start of date t.
If a firm has a vacancy at t, it can find itself in one of three possible situations at t+ 1. First, a) it
does not find a worker at t and hence will have a vacancy at t + 1, or b) it finds a young worker this
period; this worker gets separated with probability bt in which case the firm will have a vacancy next
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period, or the worker does not get separated [with probability (1− bt)] in which case the firm will not
have a vacancy at t+ 1, and c) it finds an old worker this period in which case the firm will definitely
have a vacancy at t+ 1. Then, it follows that the flow into Fv,t+1 is given by
Fv,t+1 = Ff,t + (1− θ)Fv,t + θu˜y,tbFv,t + θu˜o,tFv,t
while the flow into Ff,t+1 is given by
Ff,t+1 = θu˜y,t(1− b)Fv,t.
Accounting restrictions require that
Fv,t + Ff,t = Ft
hold. It can be easily shown that the steady state masses of firms are as follows:
F = α
2
·
2− α(1− b)
θ + (1− b)
¸
, Fv =
α
2θ [2− α(1− b)] , Ff =
α(1− b)
2
where Ff = e has to hold.
B Steady state measures of workers and firms in the discouraged
worker case
Analogously, it follows that
u˜y ≡
uy
U =
0.5
1
2 +
(1−α)
2
=
1
2− α ; u˜o ≡
(1−α)
2
1
2 +
(1−α)
2
=
1− α
2− α
Retirees (displaced workers who do not search when old):
r = αb
2
; eo =
α(1− b)
2
; Ff =
α(1− b)
2
Fv =
α(1− b) (2− α)
θ [2(1− b) + α(1− α)] ; F =
α(1−b)
2
θ
h
1− b2−α −
1−α
2
i + α(1− b)
2
C The discouraged worker constraint
This refers to the participation decisions of separated workers. In particular, given the assumption
that all separated workers choose to retire, we then verify that an individual separated worker would
choose not to engage in job search (we make sure the conjectured equilibrium is robust to individual
deviations). Of course, we still need to verify that the old-employed still want to work and the young
will search for jobs. The algorithm is outlined in the following steps:
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1. A young worker with a job contact bargains with his potential employer over the wage he
will earn. The gains from obtaining employment will include — (i) wages he will earn if he retains
his job when old (weo) and the accompanying pension benefits (δηwy); (ii) if he should lose his job
(the match breaks down), the conjectured equilibrium is that upon reaching old age, he will accept
the pension benefits and not search for a job. That is, when a young worker with a job contact
is bargaining with the firm, he cannot commit to looking for a job when old instead of taking the
benefits (this is because in the conjectured equilibrium, you would be better oﬀ by taking the
benefits). So, the wage for the young worker is the one where as an old worker he will choose to
follow the equilibrium path in the future.
2. One possibility is the following: a young worker’s job match breaks down (he becomes a
separated worker when old). It is conjectured that the separated worker is better oﬀ choosing
to take the public pension benefits rather than searching for a new job. However, this requires
verifying that these participation constraints hold. Thus, we examine the possibility of a separated
worker who, individually, considers the returns to search given that all separated workers do not
search. To do this, he first computes the wage he would earn should he be able to make a job
contact (this is oﬀ the equilibrium path). Denote this wage as ws,DW . At this point, his wages
when young are exogenous (they occurred in the prior period). In this manner, we check to see
that the conjectured equilibrium is robust to individual deviations. Thus, we have the following
“discouraged worker constraint” [alluded to in Definition B in the text]:
(1− τ)ηwy > −s+ α
£
(1− τ)ws,DW + δ (1− τ) ηwy
¤
+ (1− α)(1− τ)ηwy (22)
where
ws,DW = λ(p− h) + (1− λ) (1− δ) (1− τ) ηwy
(1− λ) (1− τ) + λ(1 + τ)
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